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I. INTRODUCTION

The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(NAAEC) 1 had the potential to transform the trade and environment
debate when the governments of Canada, Mexico, and the United States
made citizen participation in environmental law development and
enforcement a central component of regional trade issues. The
NAAEC's focus on regional trade issues and citizen participation
derives from environmentalists' opposition to the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which they believed would encourage
member governments to relax enforcement of environmental laws or
weaken environmental laws to attract industry. The NAAEC's Preamble
announces "the importance of public participation in conserving,
Associate Professor & Director, International Environmental Law Project (IELP), Lewis
& Clark Law School. He is the principal author of the Migratory Birds submission discussed
throughout this article. He thanks Greg Block for his help this past year working with IELP and
for his substantial comments on this article. He also thanks Geoffrey Garver and John Knox for
their helpful comments. An earlier version of this article was submitted to the Ten-year Review
and Assessment Committee (TRAC), which examined the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation.
+ IELP Law Clerks. IELP is the international environmental law clinic at Lewis & Clark
Law School in which students work on a range of international environmental issues. For a
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http://www.lclark.edu/org/ielp/. Deborah Scott, J.D. expected 2005, presented some of the ideas
in this article at the public meeting organized by the Joint Public Advisory Committee on Oct. 2,
2003 in Montreal.
1. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M.
1480 [hereinafter NAAEC].
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protecting and enhancing the environment.", 2 Article 1 of the NAAEC
elevates the promotion of transparency and public participation in the
development of environmental law to a primary objective of the
NAAEC. It also calls on the parties to the NAAEC to strengthen
cooperation, to develop and improve environmental practices, 3and to
enhance compliance with and enforcement of environmental law.
The NAAEC establishes the Citizen Submission Process of
Articles 14 and 15 as the linchpin of the nexus between citizen
participation, environmental enforcement, and trade. Through Articles
14 and 15, citizens may present submissions to the Secretariat of the
Council for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) alleging failures of a
government to enforce environmental law. This innovative mechanism
provides a valuable opportunity for North Americans to address
enforcement issues in the context of regional free trade. The Citizen
Submission Process is widely regarded as the most innovative and
closely-watched aspect of the NAFTA environmental side agreement.4
Many had regarded the Citizen Submission Process as a potential model
for accountability and governance for a new breed of international
institutions-a positive response to globalization that gives citizens a
voice in the often impenetrable affairs of international organizations.5
Citizens had strongly supported the Citizen Submission Process and
played an active role in supporting and employing the mechanism.6 The
CEC's Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC) designed the Citizen
Submissions to "play a unique-and indispensable-role in fostering

2. Id. pmbl., at 1482.
3. Id. art. 1, at 1483.
4. See, e.g., John H. Knox & David L. Markell, The Innovative North American
Commissionfor EnvironmentalCooperation, in GREENING THE NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN
COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION I (David L. Markell & John H. Knox, eds.

2003).
5. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PROJECT, COMMENTS ON ISSUES RELATING TO
ARTICLES 14 AND 15 OF THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL

COOPERATION 1 (Oct. 2, 2003), available at http://www.lclark.edu/org/ielp/objects/IELP
commentsen.pdf.
6. For example, the International Environmental Law Project (IELP) drafted the Migratory
Bird Submission with the Center for International Environmental Law on behalf of the nine
groups signing on to that submission. Alliance for the Wild Rockies, et al., Submission to the
Commission on Environmental Cooperation Pursuant to Article 14 of the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Migratory Birds, A14/SEM-99-002/0I1/SUB (Nov.
17, 1999) (SEM 99-002), available at http://www.Iclark.edu/org/ielp/cec.html [hereinafter
Migratory Birds - Submission].
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the vigorous environmental enforcement that is a necessary component
of expanded free trade under NAFTA. ' 7
This early support, however, has waned considerably as the
decisions of the CEC's Council, comprising the top environmental
officials of the three member States, have eroded public confidence in
the process. 8 The Council has marginalized the Secretariat's
independence by narrowing the scope of submissions, a role designated
to the Secretariat. In addition, it has ignored the JPAC's advice on
implementation of the submission process. 9 Moreover, the member
governments have chosen to treat the Citizen Submission Process as
adversarial, rather than cooperative. For example, the United States has
frustrated efforts of citizens' groups to promote enforcement of
environmental law, mischaracterized allegations made by citizens'
groups, and failed to heed any suggestions for improving enforcement
included in submissions or factual records.' 0
Although the Council's decisions have been widely criticized," the
Council has taken no notice of this criticism. The Council appears
unwilling to allow the submission process to mature and flourish. The
JPAC has made repeated, and increasingly exasperated, attempts to
convince the Council that the submission process needs breathing room
to develop to its widely desired potential. Citizens' groups that sought
to use the Citizen Submission Process in a balanced and fair way to
examine government conduct are simply turning away from the process
until the Council pledges to respect the roles and boundaries clearly
articulated in the NAAEC. The JPAC recently excoriated the Council
12
for intervening inappropriately in the Citizen Submission Process,

7. JOINT
COOPERATION
ARTICLES 14
COOPERATION,

PUBLIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE [JPAC], COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
OF NORTH AMERICA [CEC], LESSONS LEARNED: CITIZEN SUBMISSIONS UNDER
AND 15 OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL
FINAL REPORT TO THE COUNCIL OF THE COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL

COOPERATION (June 6, 2001), http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/JPAC/rep 11 -e-fmalEN.PDF.
8. See Letter from Randy L. Christensen, Sierra Legal Defense Fund, to CEC Council
(Mar. 6, 2002), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/JPAC/Sierra to-Council-BCMining.pdf
(stating that the Council's actions could "threaten to strip the citizen submission process of its
integrity, utility and legitimacy").
9. The Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC) "may provide advice to the Council on
any matter within the scope of this agreement.., and on the implementation and further
elaboration of this agreement, and may perform such other functions as the Council may direct."
NAAEC, supra note 1, art. 16(4), at 1489.

10. See infra Section Ill(C).
11. See e.g., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PROJECT, supra note 5; Letter from
Christensen, supra note 8.
12. JPAC, CEC, Advice to Council 03-05 (Dec. 17, 2003), http://www.cec.org/
files/PDF/JPAC/Advice03-05-EN.pdf [hereinafter JPAC, Advice to Council 03-05].

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

(Vol. 26:415

hopefully representing the low point, rather than the end point, for
citizen participation in trade agreements.
This Article assesses the environmental and institutional
consequences of the Council's efforts to undermine the Citizen
Submission Process. Part I provides the background on the Citizen
Submission Process to the NAAEC. Part III discusses the environmental
results from the Citizen Submission Process by comparing the role of
the Secretariat, the Council, and the United States. In particular, it
analyzes how the efforts of the Council and the United States have
seriously inhibited the Citizen Submission Process from achieving more
positive environmental results and deeply undermined the Secretariat
and the JPAC. Consequently, support for the Citizen Submission
Process in the United States is very low. Part IV analyzes the negative
impacts of the Council's actions. Part V concludes with suggestions for
improving the Citizen Submission Process through the implementation
of a number of recommendations to restore public confidence in the
Citizen Submission Process and reaffirm the process's unique character
as a bridge between environment and trade.
II. THE CITIZEN SUBMISSION PROCESS
The NAAEC allows nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and
individuals to file submissions with the Secretariat alleging that Canada,
Mexico, or the United States "is failing to effectively enforce its
environmental law."' 3 The submitter must provide sufficient
information to allow the Secretariat to review the submission,
demonstrate that it has communicated in writing with the relevant
authorities concerning the matter of the petition, indicate the party's
response, if any, and meet other basic eligibility requirements. 14 The
Secretariat has discretion to reject submissions that fail to meet any of
these requirements. The submitter has no mechanism to appeal the
Secretariat's decision.
If the Secretariat determines that the submission meets these
Article 14(1) criteria, it then has discretion to request a response to the
submission from the party "against" whom the submission is directed. If
the Secretariat believes that a response is unnecessary, the matter is
closed; the submitter cannot appeal this decision either. In deciding

13. NAAEC, supra note 1, art. 14(1), at 1488.
14. Id. The submitter must, among other things, also write the submission in the language
specified by that Party, clearly identify the organization or person submitting the petition, and aim
the submission at enforcement, and not at harassment of industry. Id.

2004]

Citizen Submissions Process of the NAAEC

whether a party should prepare a response, the Secretariat considers
whether the submission alleges harm to the person or organization
making the submission; whether the submission, alone or in
combination with other submissions, raises matters whose further study
in this process would advance the goals of the NAAEC; whether private
remedies available under the party's law have been pursued; and
15
whether the submission is drawn exclusively from mass media reports.
If the Secretariat determines that a response from the "defendant"
party is necessary, the party has thirty days to respond. 16 If the party
chooses to respond, it should state whether the matter is or was the
subject of pending judicial or administrative proceedings, and whether
private remedies are available.17 If a pending judicial or administrative
proceeding is "pursued by the Party,"' 8 meaning the NAFTA party
whose enforcement policies are being challenged, then the Secretariat
may "proceed no further." 19 Nevertheless, the Secretariat has refused to
recommend the development of a factual record even where the pending
proceeding was initiated by someone other than a party to avoid
interfering or duplicating efforts.20

15. NAAEC, supra note 1, art. 14(2), at 1488. In one of the first Article 14 petitions, the
Secretariat concluded that the burden to show harm is substantially less for Article 14 petitions
than for civil actions in many countries. Mexico, the responding Party, argued that submitters did
not adequately allege harm to the members of their organizations. Nonetheless, the Secretariat
ruled that the submitters met their burden:
In considering harm, the Secretariat notes the importance and character of the resource
in question-a portion of the magnificent Paradise corral reef located in the Caribbean
waters of Quintana Roo. While the Secretariat recognizes that the submitters may not
have alleged the particularized, individual harm required to acquire legal standing to
bring suit in some civil proceedings in North America, the especially public nature of
marine resources bring the submitters within the spirit and intent of Article 14 of the
NAAEC.
Recommendation of the Secretariat to Council for the Development of a Factual Record in
accordance with Articles 14 and 15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation at 5, Cozumel, A14/SEM/96-001/07/ADV (CEC June 7, 1996) (SEM 96-001),
availableat http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/96- I-ADV-E.pdf.
16. NAAEC, supra note 1, art. 14(3), at 1488.
17. Id.
18. Id. art. 45(3).
19. Council Res. 99-06, CEC, C/99-00/RES/07/Rev.3, para. 9.4 (June 29, 2001),
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COLTNCIL/99-06eEN.pdf.
20. See Determination pursuant to Articles 14 & 15 of the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation, Oldman River I, A14/SEM/96-003/12/15(l) (Apr. 2, 1997) (SEM
96-003), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/96-3-DET-OE3.pdf [hereinafter Oldman
River I-Article 15(1) Determination]. When the plaintiffs in the judicial case abandoned the
judicial proceedings, the submitters of the Article 14 submission re-petitioned to the Secretariat a
year later. The Friends of the Oldman River, North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation Article 14 Submission, Oldman River, A14/SEM-97-006/01/SUB (Oct. 4, 1997)
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Similarly, the NAAEC does not explicitly require a submitter to

first pursue private remedies before a petition might be accepted for
purposes of Article 14; it is merely something about which the
defending party may advise the Secretariat. The Secretariat has refused
to consider a submission because the submitters had not "diligently
pursu[ed] local remedies between the time of the government's adoption
and implementation
of [the law] and the date the submission was
21
filed.q

The Secretariat has discretion to request authorization from the
Council to prepare a factual record upon receiving a response from the
defending party.2 2 Again, the Secretariat may determine that the
response is sufficient and end the matter with no chance for the
submitter to appeal. If the Secretariat recommends to the Council that a
factual record is warranted, the Council must approve the Secretariat's
recommendation by a two-thirds vote.23 If the Council approves the
recommendation to develop a factual record, the Secretariat may

(SEM 97-006), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/97-6-SUB-E'pdf After reviewing
the new submission, the Secretariat determined that a response from the Party was warranted.
Article 15(1) Notification to Council that Development of a Factual Record is Warranted,
Oldman River II, A 14/SEM-97-006/15/ADV (July 19, 1999) (SEM 97-006), http://www.cec.org/
files/pdf/sem/97-6-ADV-E.pdf. The Secretariat has similarly declined to recommend a factual
record where criminal investigations were pending, even though it found that such investigations
do not meet the definition of "pending judicial or administrative proceeding." In Cytrar 11,
however, the Secretariat rejected Mexico's claim that a pending international arbitration
precluded the Secretariat from moving forward, because it found that the subject matter of the
arbitration was not the same as the Article 14 submission. Article 15(1) Notification to Council
that Development of a Factual Record is Warranted, Cytrar II, A14/SEMI01-001/41/ADV (July
29, 2002) (SEM 01-001), availableat http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/01-1-ADV-E.pdf.
21. Determination Pursuant to Articles 14 & 15 of the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation at 3, Canadian Environmental Defence Fund, A14/SEM/97004/03/14(1) (May 26, 1997) (SEM 97-004), availableat http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/97-4DET-E.pdf. In BC-Mining, the Secretariat undertook an exhaustive analysis of whether submitters
had pursued private remedies. Article 15(1) Notification to Council that Development of a
Factual Record is Warranted, BC-Mining, A14/SEM-98-004/15/ADV (May 11, 2001) (SEM-98.004), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/ACF 11 .PDF. After a consideration of private
remedies pursued by other organizations, the greater enforcement remedies available to the
government, and the experience of seeing private prosecutions taken over by the government and
then dismissed, the Secretariat recommended the preparation of a factual record. Id. at 26. The
Secretariat also allowed a submission to move forward based on the claim of submitters that
"[t]here are no realistic private remedies available and such avenues for redress that may be
available have been pursued by Submitters and others without success." Determination in
Accordance with Articles 14(1) and 14(2) of the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation, Ontario Power Generation at 8, A14/SEM/03-001/22/14(1)(2) (Sept. 19, 2003)
(SEM 03-001), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/03-1-DET%2014 -12-en.pdf.
22. NAAEC, supra note 1, art. 15(1), at 1488.
23. Id. art. 15(2), at 1488.
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consider information that is publicly available or information submitted
to it by interested persons, NGOs or the JPAC.2 4 The Secretariat does
not have the authority, however, to subpoena documents.25
III.

THE ENVIRONMENTAL RESULTS OF THE CITIZEN SUBMISSION
PROCESS

Whether the Citizen Submission Process results in environmental
benefits cannot solely be judged on whether the member governments
improve enforcement when confronted with a submission alleging a
failure to enforce environmental laws effectively. While that certainly is
an important element of the process's success or failure, the success of
the process can also be viewed in light of the success of the institutions
formed to implement it. In the institutional sense, the Citizen
Submission Process has succeeded; the Secretariat has established itself
as a highly professional institution that carefully interprets the NAAEC
in a way that promotes the NAAEC's objectives. On the other hand, the
Citizen Submission Process has had fewer concrete environmental
achievements, largely because of obstruction of the process by the
Council or by the parties acting alone.
A. The Role of the Secretariat

Scholars, NAAEC review committees, and members of the public
are virtually unanimous in applauding the Secretariat's rigorous review
of submissions for eligibility and for determination on whether a factual
record is warranted.2 6 With respect to eligibility, the Secretariat has

24. Id. art. 15(4), at 1488.
25. The Secretariat must submit a draft factual record to the Council. Any party has fortyfive days to comment on the accuracy of the draft. Neither the Council nor the Secretariat is under
an obligation to make the draft public, and the NAAEC does not expressly grant interested
persons or NGOs the right to comment on the draft. The Secretariat must incorporate any
comments of the Parties in the final factual record and submit it to the Council. The Council, by a
two-thirds vote, may make public the factual record. Id. art. 15(5), (6), at 1489.
26. Accord John H. Knox, A New Approach to Compliance with International
Environmental Law: The Submissions Procedureof the NAFTA Environmental Commission, 28
ECOLOGY L. Q. 1, 96-97 (2001) (stating "The Secretariat has not shown any particular deference
to states' suggested interpretations of the [NAAEC] Agreement. Conversely, it has dismissed
submissions-even by major environmental groups-that did not meet the requirements for
admissibility. In short, the Secretariat's decisions appear to be consistently grounded on carefully
reasoned legal interpretations of the [NAAEC] Agreement rather than on fear of adverse reactions
by, or the desire to carry favor with, either states or submitters."). In addition, a review of the
Independent Review Committee concluded that: "[t]he record on the submissions that have been
subject to Secretariat decisions to date appears to show a consistent and well reasoned group of
decisions. While observers (and the Parties) may, and some certainly have, criticized specific
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denied submissions that clearly fail to meet the requirements of Articles

14 and 15 and it has accepted those that clearly meet such requirements.
Where the submission required interpretation of Article 14, the

Secretariat has provided thoughtful legal analysis to support its position.
With respect to whether a factual record is warranted, the Secretariat's
actions have also been exemplary. For example, in Migratory Birds, in
which the submitters alleged that the United States was failing to
enforce the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) against loggers, the

Secretariat carefully reviewed the U.S. response and determined that the
preparation of a factual record was warranted. In its determination, the
Secretariat made several significant findings of first impression,
including whether the U.S. failure to enforce the MBTA resulted from a
reasonable exercise of prosecutorial discretion or from bona fide
decisions to allocate resources to the enforcement of other
environmental matters.27 The Secretariat, however, has also found that

five submissions, while meeting eligibility requirements under Article
14, did not warrant development of a factual record.

8

The Secretariat

has been consistently evenhanded in its decisions, and has shown no
bias toward or against submitters or governments .29
decisions, this Committee has seen nothing to suggest that the decisions of the Secretariat lack
proper foundation." CEC, FOUR-YEAR REVIEW OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION: REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW COMMITTEE § 3.3.3

(1998).
27. Article 15(1) Notification to Council that Development of a Factual Record is
Warranted, Migratory Birds, A14/SEM/99-002/1l/ADV (Dec. 15, 2000) (SEM 99-002),
available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/ACFA30.pdf [hereinafter Migratory BirdsNotification to Council].
28. Under guideline 9.6 the process was terminated by the Secretariat so there is no factual
record. See Oldman River I-Article 15(1) Determination, supra note 20; Determinaci6n del
Secretariado en conformidad con el articulo 15(1) del Acuerdo de Cooperaci6n Ambiental de
America del Norte, Lago de Chapala, A14/SEM/97-007/16/15(l) (July 14, 2000) (SEM 97-007),
available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/ACFA4D.pdf; Determinaci6n del Secretariado en
conformidad con el articulo 15(1) del Acuerdo de Cooperaci6n Ambiental de Amrrica del Norte,
Cytrar I, A14/SEM198-005/27/15(l) (Oct. 26, 2000) (SEM 98-005), available at
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/ACFBDF.pdf; Secretariat Determination under Article 15(l)
that Development of a Factual Record is Not Warranted, Great Lakes, A 14/SEM/98-003/24/15(l)
(Oct. 5, 2001) (SEM 98-003), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/98-3-DET-E3.pdf;
Determinaci6n del Secretariado en conformidad con el articulo 15(1) del Acuerdo de
Cooperaci6n Ambiental de America del Norte, Aeropuerto de la Ciudad de Mexico,
A14/SEM/02-002/27/15(1) (Sept. 25, 2002) (SEM 02-002), available at http://www.cec.org/
files/pdf/sem/02-2-DET-2-S.pdf.
29. For example, many environmental groups opposed the Secretariat's interpretation of
"environmental law" when it ruled that a legislative act repealing the applicability of
environmental laws for logging projects did not constitute an "environmental law" within the
meaning of Article 45 of the NAAEC. See, e.g., Article 14(2) Determination, Spotted Owl,
A14/SEM/95-001/04/14(2) (Sept. 21, 1995) (SEM 95-001), available at http://www.cec.org/
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In sum, the Secretariat has fulfilled its role in the process in a
competent and professional manner. Its decisions and legal
interpretations are rigorous, not capricious. 30 As a result, the Secretariat
has been instrumental in ensuring the integrity of the Citizen
Submission Process. 3 1 Consequently, the institutional framework exists
within the CEC for achieving environmental benefits from the Citizen
Submission Process.
B. The Role of the Council

In contrast to the positive role of the Secretariat, the Council has
adversely affected the ability of the Citizen Submission Process to
achieve better environmental results. The Council has degraded the
process through three principal means: (1) disallowing examinations of
allegations of a broad pattern of ineffective enforcement, (2) limiting
the scope of factual records, and (3) questioning the sufficiency of
information. Because the Council members have acted in their role as
parties, these criticisms also bear on whether an affected party is
meeting its obligations under the Citizen Submission Process.
1. Disallowing Investigations Into Broad Patterns of Nonenforcement
Submitters quickly recognized that the process was especially
useful when examining a broader pattern of government conduct which,
if not adequately justified or explained, might reveal a systematic failure
to enforce environmental law.3 2 This is especially true in the United
States where the Supreme Court has ruled that an agency's decision not
to take enforcement action with respect to a specific case is "presumed
immune from judicial review." 33 Moreover, while microscoping in on

files/pdf/semi/95-1-DET-E1.PDF; Determination pursuant to Articles 14 & 15 of the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Logging Rider, A14/SEMI 95-002/03/14(1)
(Dec. 8, 1995) (SEM 95-002), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/95-2-DET-OE.pdf
As John Knox concludes, "There is room for reasonable minds to disagree on the correct legal
outcome of the first two submissions, since the Agreement does not clearly address the issues
involved. The key point, however, is that the Secretariat reached a plausible, principled
interpretation." Knox, supra note 26, at 102 n.439.
30. Accord David L. Markell, The Commission for Environmental Cooperation's Citizen
Submission Process, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 545, 566-67 (2000).
31. See id. at 564-66 (describing further details on the decisions of the Secretariat). On a
more personal level, members of the Secretariat have always found time to answer questions with
respect to the Citizen Submission Process, whether of a substantive or procedural matter. That is
true whether those members were responding to questions directly relating to the MigratoryBirds
submission, other submissions, or the submission process in general.
32. Accord Markell, supra note 30, at 558.
33. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
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isolated, fact-specific cases occasionally might be appropriate, broader
patterns of conduct are more likely to elevate the concerns to a regional
level. This directly advances the NAAEC's goals and objectives,
including the effective enforcement of environmental law in North
America. Investigations of broad patterns of nonenforcement would also
allow the Citizen Submission Process to yield greater environmental
results, because widespread enforcement failures would almost certainly
levy an important environmental toll. Shining a spotlight on systematic
enforcement deficiencies through the Citizen Submission Process would
help ensure that NAFTA countries uphold their part of the cooperative
bargain not to reduce environmental enforcement due to competitive
pressures.
The Secretariat has consistently provided clear and well-reasoned
analysis of the so-called "pattern" issue. The Secretariat has stated in
compelling terms how these broader claims were consistent with, and
furthered the goals of, the NAAEC.34 Narrow, highly specific fact
patterns often shift the focus from government conduct to the acts or
omissions of a single industry, business, or other entity. Single events
may also mask the aggregate effects of policies or practices. Moreover,
they are much more easily defended by asserting enforcement
discretion, a defense that should be exceedingly difficult to claim for
widespread patterns of nonenforcement.
Nonetheless, it has become abundantly clear that the Council is
uncomfortable defending government enforcement practices and
policies and would rather mount highly technical and legal defenses to
specific, isolated cases. The Council demonstrated its hostility to the
pattern issue by first attempting to quietly renegotiate the Guidelines on
Enforcement Matters (Guidelines), 5 an approach that was halted by
strong JPAC and public opposition at the June 2000 Council meeting in
Dallas, Texas. In response to JPAC and public concerns expressed at
that meeting, Council Resolution 00-09 established the JPAC-led

34. For example, the Secretariat stated in MigratoryBirds:
In other words, the larger the scale of the asserted failure, the more likely it may be to
warrant developing a factual record, other things being equal. If the citizen submission
process were construed to bar consideration of alleged widespread enforcement
failures, the failures that potentially pose the greatest threats to accomplishment of the
Agreement's objectives, and the most serious and far-reaching threats of harm to the
environment, would be beyond the scope of that process. This limitation in scope
would seem to be counter to the objects and purposes of the NAAEC.
Migratory Birds-Notification to Council, supra note 27, at 10.
35. Council Res. 99-06, CEC, C/99-OO/RES/07/Rev.3 (June 29, 2001), http://www.cec.org/
files/PDF/COUNCIL/99-06eEN.pdf.
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process for addressing concerns about the implementation of the Citizen
Submission Process. The Council, however, soon found it could attack
the pattern issue and circumvent the JPAC consultation process by
simply reshaping the scope of factual records when deciding whether to
instruct the Secretariat to prepare a factual record. Most recently, the
Council has developed a new line of attack--questioning the
"sufficiency" of the information upon which the submission is based.3 6
2. Impermissibly Narrowing the Scope of Factual Records
The Council's actions to narrow the scope of factual records and
interpret provisions of the NAAEC clearly within the purview of the
Secretariat are not only troubling, but also ultra vires, beyond its
authority granted by the NAAEC.3 7 The Council's actions have eroded
support for the NAAEC 38 as well as for the use of provisions similar to
the process established by Articles 14 and 15 in other free trade
agreements. 39 The Council's refusal to respect the boundaries delineated
in the NAAEC has led to repeated calls from the JPAC, the National
Advisory Committee (NAC), and independent review committees for
the Council to step back and allow the process to operate independently,
as intended. For example, the U.S. Governmental Advisory Committee
recently declared that the Council's decisions to narrow the scope of
factual records had "eviscerate[d]" the autonomy of the Secretariat to
define the scope of the factual record. 40 The JPAC has raised similar
concerns, even charging the Council with narrowing factual records and
taking other action on a case-by-case basis-through its vote of the

36. See Council Res. 03-05, CEC, C/C.01/03-02/RES/O5/fmal (Apr. 22, 2003),
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/Res-Ontario-Logging-en.pdf.
37. David L. Markell, The CEC Submission Process: On or Off Course?, in GREENING
NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 274, 28485 (David L. Markell & John H. Knox, eds. 2003).
38. The Sierra Legal Defense Fund, in a letter to the Council, stated that the Council "fails
to respect the independence of the CEC Secretariat" and that the Council's Resolution 01-11
"threatens to strip the citizen submission process of its integrity, utility and legitimacy." Letter
from Randy L. Christensen, supra note 8. Also, the Center for International Environmental Law
wrote to JPAC that the Council's narrowing of the Migratory Bird Submission "limit[s] the utility
of the citizen submission process." Letter from Stephen Porter, Senior Attorney, Center for
International Environmental Law to JPAC (Oct. 17, 2001) (on file with the Loyola of Los
Angeles International & Comparative Law Review).
39. For example, a citizen submission process was not included in the recent U.S.-Chile free
trade agreement.
40. Letter from Denise Ferguson-Southard, Chair of the Governmental Advisory Committee
the U.S. Representative to the CEC, to Christine Whitman, Administrator of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (Oct. 19, 2001) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles
International & Comparative Law Review).
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Secretariat's recommendation of a factual record-as a means of
circumventing the JPAC-led public consultation procedure for
considering revisions to the Article 14 and 15 Submission Guidelines. 4 1
The NAAEC carefully establishes a system of "checks and
balances" by granting the Council and Secretariat distinct roles and
clear boundaries. In this case, the Secretariat has the duty to decide the
scope of the factual record. By its own terms, Article 15 of the NAAEC
confers to the Council the power to approve or reject the Secretariat's
recommendation to prepare a factual record. Although the Council has
the duty to "oversee" the Secretariat,4 2 that is far different from ignoring
or overturning the Secretariat's NAAEC-mandated Article 14 and 15
duties. By substituting its own judgment of what constitutes "sufficient
information" and the appropriate scope of a factual record, the Council
denies the Secretariat its proper role established by the NAAEC. In so
doing, the Council further undermines public confidence that it will
allow the process to operate as designed, even if that occasionally
shines an embarrassing spotlight on government conduct. If citizens
perceive the process as rigged and refuse to use it, then the process
cannot provide beneficial environmental results.
Narrowing the scope of factual records beyond the Secretariat's
specific recommendations has already radically altered the balance
between Secretariat and Council functions. Without question, the
submitters would never have prepared Migratory Birds if they had
known that the Council would, in an arbitrary and unexplained fashion,
limit the record to two specific instances cited only as examples of
widespread government nonenforcement. The Migratory Birds
submitters found the Citizen Submission Process attractive only because
of its capacity to investigate the United States's broad pattern of
nonenforcement of the MBTA.4 3 Moreover, it is highly doubtful that the

41. See, e.g., JPAC, CEC, Advice to Council 01-07, J/01-03/ADV/01-07/Rev. 3 (Oct. 23,
2001), http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/JPAC/01-07E.pdf ("[JPAC] is compelled to express its
frustration at being forced once again to advise on issues related to Articles 14 and 15, because
past-agreed upon procedures are being ignored or circumvented."); JPAC, CEC, Advice to
Council, 02-03 J/02-01/ADV/02-03/Rev. 1 (Mar. 8, 2002), http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/JPAC/0203E.pdf (stating Council's narrowing actions are "effectively eliminating an opportunity for
public input into this very important issue; and.., is considered by JPAC as a defacto change to
the Guidelines for Submissions on Enforcement Matters under Articles 14 and 15 of the
NAAEC').
42. NAAEC, supranote 1, art. 10(l)(c), at 1485.
43. Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (2000). The MBTA
implements four international treaties, including agreements with Canada and Mexico, aimed at
protecting migratory birds. Section 703 of the MBTA prohibits any person from killing or
"taking" migratory birds, including the destruction of nests, the crushing of eggs, and the killing
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Secretariat would have recommended the development of a factual
record to the Council if the Secretariat had known that the scope of the
submission would be narrowed in this manner.4 4 The absurdity of the
result is patent: the Council directed the Secretariat to develop a factual
record in MigratoryBirds that resembled neither the issues presented by
the submitters nor those recommended for study by the Secretariat.
Indeed, it is the factual record that nobody wanted.
The Council's decision to narrow the scope of the factual record
prevented the Secretariat from obtaining exactly the type of information
submitters sought in order to achieve positive environmental results
from the process.45 As reported in the factual record, the Council's
decision precluded the Secretariat from investigating and obtaining a

of nestlings and fledglings, "by any means or in any manner," unless the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS) issues a valid permit. The United States has never prosecuted a logger or logging
company for a violation of the MBTA, even though it acknowledges that the MBTA has
consistently been violated by persons logging on federal and non-federal land. In fact, the
Director of the FWS has stated that the FWS, the agency responsible for enforcement of the
MBTA, "has had a longstanding, unwritten policy relative to the MBTA that no enforcement or
investigative action should be taken in incidents involving logging operations, that result in the
taking of non-endangered, non-threatened, migratory birds and/or their nests." Memorandum
from U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, to Service Enforcement Officers, MBTA Enforcement
Policy (Mar. 7, 1996), availableat http://www.cec.org.
44. For example, if the Migratory Birds Submission only related to the two California
nonenforcement examples that became the focus of the factual record, the Secretariat may have
answered several key eligibility requirements differently and decided to reject the
Submission. Questions relating to the pursuit of private remedies, harassment of industry, or
reasonable use of prosecutorial discretion may all have different answers depending on whether
submitters allege general nonenforcement behavior or nonenforcement in a specific instance. As a
result, the Secretariat may have determined that such a submission did not warrant a factual
record. The Secretariat implied such a result in the context of the narrowed scope of Oldman
River II: "It should not be assumed that the Secretariat Article 15(1) Notification to Council
recommending a factual record for [Oldman River II] was intended to include a recommendation
to prepare a factual record of the scope set out [in the Council's limiting Resolution], or that the
Secretariat would have recommended a factual record of this scope." Factual Record at 90,
Oldman River II (CEC Aug. 11, 2003) (SEM-97-006), available at http://www.cec.org/
files/pdf/sem/97-6-FFR en.pdf.
45. The Council has narrowed the factual record of other submissions. See Final Factual
Record at 23, BC Logging, (CEC Aug. 11, 2003) (SEM-00-04), available at
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/semi/00-4-FFR-en.pdf (excluding information regarding Canada's
enforcement of the FisheriesAct against logging operations). See also Final Factual Record at 1819, (CEC Aug. 12, 2003) (SEM-98-004), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/98-4FFR-en.pdf (excluding information regarding the lack of enforcement of the FisheriesAct in
regards to mining operations in British Columbia); Final Factual Record at 17-18, (CEC Aug. 11,
2003) (SEM-97-006), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/97-6-FFR-en.pdf (excluding
prosecutions as a tool for enforcement of the Fisheries Act and the basis for Canada's assertion
that voluntary compliance of the Fisheries Act represents legitimate use of discretion of
enforcement powers).
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vast amount of information that would have proved extraordinarily
valuable:
* Information regarding the effectiveness nationwide of the
"non-enforcement"
initiatives, such as population
monitoring and public outreach, described in the US
response [as effective alternatives to MBTA enforcement, in
the absence of enforcement against logging operations].
*

Information regarding the number of migratory birds taken.
(as defined in the MBTA) as a result of logging in the
United States and a comparison of that number to the
number of birds taken as a result of other activities described
in the United States response as to which the United States
has taken enforcement action or has established a permit
program under the MBTA.

"

Information regarding the effect nationwide of limiting the
MBTA permit program to activities involving the intentional
killing of migratory birds, including information regarding
the effect that a permit program for logging would have in
reducing bird deaths due to logging, and regarding the
assertion that difficulties in monitoring compliance would
undermine the utility of an MBTA permit program for
logging, both in general terms and in comparison to hunting
and other activities for which the FWS issues MBTA
permits.

*

Information regarding whether, as a general matter, it is
easier to require or encourage the use of best practices to
reduce takes of migratory birds in contexts other than
logging, and whether the use of such best practices in other
contexts is likely to be more effective than in the logging
context.

*

Information regarding the assertion that, as a general matter,
it is more effective to leverage enforcement resources to
achieve greater levels of compliance for activities other than
logging than it is for logging.

*

Information regarding whether the US practice to date of
only pursuing enforcement action under the ESA in
connection with threatened or endangered migratory birds
killed or taken as a result of logging activity is an effective
means of achieving the goals of the MBTA.
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*

Information regarding the other examples included in the
submission to illustrate the Submitters' enforcement
concerns, in particular the four specific timber sales in
Georgia that the Submitters estimated would destroy an
estimated 666 nests containing migratory bird eggs or
fledglings and the seven specific timber sales in Arkansas
in the death of an
that the Submitters asserted would result
46
estimated 9,000 migratory songbirds.

We have spent considerable space outlining the types of
information excluded because submitters in Migratory Birds view the
information obtained through the factual record as unhelpful to the
overall process of remedying a nationwide failure to enforce the MBTA.
Quite clearly, the submitters believe that the scale of nonenforcement
harms migratory birds tremendously. The environmental and
enforcement benefits that would have flowed from a factual record that
included the information listed above would far exceed the benefits
obtained from the factual record resulting from the Council's decision
to narrow the scope of the Migratory Birds submission.
The ad hoc nature of the Council's decision-making creates great
uncertainty for both the Secretariat and submitters. Without clear rules,
neither the Secretariat nor submitters know whether Council decisions
constitute precedent or whether the Council will establish a different
rule in future cases. Even if we accept that the Council can override
decisions of the Secretariat, 4 a system must have clear rules that
establish boundaries and definitions, providing expectations for all the
participants. Articles 14 and 15 of the NAAEC establish those clear
rules: the Council votes either "yes" or "no" on whether to instruct the
Secretariat to prepare a factual record on the issues the Secretariat
recommends for further study.
3. Questioning the Sufficiency of Information
The Council recently opened a new line of attack on the pattern
issue by deciding in Ontario Logging that the submission did not
contain sufficient information to warrant the development of a factual

46. Final Factual Record at 21-22, Migratory Birds, (CEC Apr. 22, 2003) (SEM-99-002),
available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/MigratoryBirds-FFREN.pdf, [hereinafter Final
Factual Record for Migratory Birds].
47. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, FINAL REPORT: ISSUES RELATED TO ARTICLES
14 AND 15 OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 23-25

(2003) [hereinafter ELI REPORT], http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/JPAC/ELI-Art 14-15-Report-Final5-en.pdf (providing opposing views on the authority of the Council).
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record.48 The Council's strategy may entirely derail environmental
benefits of the Citizen Submission Process, because it has the effect of
rejecting the entire submission rather than just narrowing it.
Article 14 explicitly states that the Secretariat alone has authority
to determine whether a submission provides sufficient information. It
unambiguously commands that "[t]he Secretariat may consider a
submission.., if the Secretariatfinds that the submission.., provides
sufficient information to allow the Secretariat to review the
",49
submission ....
Instead of simply terminating the Ontario Logging submission
through a vote, the Council impermissibly remanded the submission to
submitters, presumably to supplement it with information the Council
deemed sufficient. While innocent in form, this approach actually
usurps the Secretariat's function of reviewing the sufficiency of
submissions by laying out markers the Secretariat must presumably
follow in its reconsideration of the matter. 50 In other words, the Council
appears to be signaling to the Secretariat that it expects the sufficiency
element to be applied in a more restrictive and limiting way. Faced with
a Secretariat that refuses to adopt a cramped definition of sufficiency,
the Council may attempt to simply revise the Guidelines, defining
sufficiency in a way that shuts down efforts to examine patterns of
government conduct.
Following this path will lead to the virtual extinction of the Citizen
Submission Process because it will terminate its most useful
applications. If we assume that the Council has banned allegations of
widespread patterns of nonenforcement, then submitters must overcome
the Council's ban by compiling a long list of specific violations tied to a
single nonenforcement policy. Yet, once submitters compile that list,
which may tax their limited resources, the Council may simply reject
the submission as containing insufficient information.

48. Council
Res. 03-05,
CEC,
C/C.01/03-02/RES/05/fmal
(Apr. 22,
2003),
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/Res-Ontario-Logging-en.pdf. The Council questioned
the sufficiency with the use of a statistical model which submitters contend provides the best
available information precisely because the government of Canada has abdicated its enforcement
responsibilities by, among other things, failing to collect the kind of information required to
assess the impact of commercial logging on bird populations protected by the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act.
49. NAAEC, supra note 1, art.14(1), at 1488 (emphasis added).
50. The Secretariat promptly found that the new Submission, which continues to employ the
statistical model objected to by Canada, met the sufficiency threshold and the Secretariat
requested a response from Canada.
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C. The Role of the Party: The United States

If the actions of affected parties bear any resemblance to the
obstructionist actions of the United States in Migratory Birds, then the

environmental benefits of the Citizen Submission Process must be
viewed as theoretical only. Because the NAAEC is designed to promote

cooperation and public participation with respect to the development
and enforcement of environmental law, 51 the uncooperative nature of
the U.S. approach has been discouraging.
Article 14(1)(e) requires a submitter to demonstrate that it has
communicated in writing to the relevant authority its concern regarding
a party's failure to effectively enforce environmental law. When the
submitters in Migratory Birds wrote to the director of the Fish and
Wildlife Service, they specifically stated that they viewed the failure to
enforce the MBTA against loggers as a violation of U.S. duties under
Article 5 of the NAAEC,5 2 which calls on Parties to "effectively enforce

its environmental laws and regulations through appropriate
governmental action. 53 Submitters also allowed the Fish and Wildlife
Service an opportunity to explain whether or not the nonenforcement
policy remained in effect. 54 The United States never responded.
In addition, the U.S. response mischaracterized the submitters'
allegations in Migratory Birds. The United States suggested that the

submitters sought MBTA enforcement for habitat modification 55 despite

the submitters making very clear that the submission related only to the
direct taking of migratory birds.56 One suspects that the United States

51. NAAEC, supra note 1, art. 1, at 1483.
52. Letter from Chris Wold, Center for International Environmental Law, to Jamie
Rappaport Clark, Director of U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Apr. 26, 1999) (on file with the
Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review).
53. NAAEC, supra note 1, art. 5, at 1483-84.
54. Letter from Chris Wold, supra note 52.
55. See, e.g., Response of the United States of America to the Submission made by the
Alliance for the Wild Rockies, et al. under Article 14 of the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation, Migratory Birds, A14/SEM/99-002/04/RES (Feb. 29, 2000) (SEM
99-002), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/ACF1842.PDF [hereinafter Migratory
Birds - Party Response] ("Targeting logging activities under the MBTA is not the most efficient,
effective or satisfactory means of protection migratory birds .... [because] habitat modification
per se is not prohibited by the MBTA.").
56. Submitters responded to the U.S. Response by stating:
[W]e would like to emphasize once again that our request for an investigation relates to
the failure to enforce the MBTA against loggers who directly kill and take protected
migratory birds by killing fledglings and nestlings, crushing eggs, and destroying nests
in violation of Section 703 of the MBTA. The United States, through the Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS), has two choices regarding enforcement of the MBTA against
loggers. It can prosecute those who directly kill or take protected migratory birds under
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believed it could quickly 57derail the submission by portraying it as the
"spotted owl on steroids."

Most significantly, the U.S. response never denied the basic
allegation of the submitters' claim. Instead, it sought to justify its
eighty-five year history of nonenforcement by suggesting that other
nonenforcement related initiatives provided better protection to
migratory birds than enforcement of the MBTA's take prohibition.5 8
The U.S. response also sought to minimize the enormity of bird kills in
logging operations by focusing on other problems facing migratory
birds. It stated that power lines kill "thousands to tens of thousands" of
birds nationwide and claimed that this toll is in "sharp contrast" to the
bird take due to logging.59 In fact, the uncontroverted evidence

presented by the submitters indicates that the magnitude of direct takes
from logging is greater than or equal to the threats, such as power lines,

singled out by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service for prosecution. U.S.
Forest Service records for the 1999 fiscal year show 302 timber sales of
more than 2 million board feet and another 1,712 smaller sales of 301 to
2 million board feet. 60 The submitters' reference to an estimated 9,000
deaths from seven timber sales, again uncontroverted by the United
States, suggests that the effect of the 302 largest sales is likely to be

large and the effect of the 2,014 sales to be enormous.
At the same time, the burden on the Fish and Wildlife Service to

enforce the law through the permitting of logging sales could be
Section 703, or it can regulate their taking of migratory birds through permits, pursuant
to Section 704 of the MBTA. It does neither.
Letter from Chris Wold and Stephen Porter, Center for International Environmental Law, to the
CEC Secretariat, Commission for Environmental Cooperation 1-2 (Apr. 4, 2000) (on file with the
Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review). This letter was never made
part of the record.
57. Litigation over the spotted owl under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) has limited
logging in the Pacific Northwest, the habitat of the owl, because logging results in habitat
modification that indirectly "takes" spotted owls in violation of the ESA. See Babbitt v. Sweet
Home Ch. of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995). Whereas the ESA only restricts
activities associated with threatened or endangered species, the MBTA applies its prohibition
against "taking" to all migratory birds, not just those that are threatened or endangered. Unlike
the ESA, however, the MBTA does not define "take" to include habitat modification as the ESA
does. See MBTA, 16 U.S.C. § 703 (omitting the term "harm" from the list of activities
constituting a take).
58. Migratory Birds - Party Response, supra note 55, at 12.
59. Migratory Birds - Party Response, supra note 55, at 6.
60. See USDA Forest Service, Timber Sale Data by Region and State, at
http://www.fs.fed.us/forestmanagement/reports/saledata/indcx.shtml
(last modified Sept. 15,
2003); USDA Forest Service, Sold and Harvest Reports for All Convertible Products, at
http://www.fs.fed.us/forestmanagement/reports/sold-harvest/index.shtml (last modified Feb. 7,
2004) (authors' calculations based on statistics provided by the Forest Service).
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relatively light compared to its existing scheme. According to the U.S.
response, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service manages 40,000 active
permits, processes about 13,000 intentional take permits annually, and
in some unspecified fashion apparently provides for the annual
6

'
permitting of some three million individuals to hunt migratory birds.
In that context, targeting a few large timber sales for MBTA
enforcement might offer an efficient return on investment of
enforcement resources.
Despite the obvious large-scale bird mortality in logging

operations and the MBTA enforcement strategies suggested by the
submitters,62 the United States never sought to engage submitters in a

constructive discussion about solutions to a vast failure to enforce an
important environmental law. Moreover, although the factual record
showed that the State of California found a way to implement a law

similar to the MBTA through prohibitions against harming nests and
nest trees, the creation of buffer zones around certain bird colonies or
rookeries, and seasonal restrictions on logging,6 3 the United States has

done nothing to adopt or even discuss similar restrictions. If California
can obtain criminal convictions in cases regarding logging operations,
surely the federal government can do the same.

Under these circumstances, it can be safely assumed that the
Migratory Birds submission has had no beneficial environmental result.
At best, submitters obtained more detail about the "Petite Policy," the
policy the United States uses to select cases for prosecution based on
conduct involved in a prior state or federal proceeding. 64 Of course, the

61. Migratory Birds - Party Response, supra note 55, at 11.
62. The submitters proposed that the United States use the Bird Conservation Plans prepared
through the Partners in Flight program which place logging impacts in the broader context of the
full range of impacts and species' needs. It also recommended seasonal restrictions on logging
based on breeding behavior of migratory birds. Such restrictions would ensure that young birds
could fledge before nests or eggs are destroyed by logging. Because most logging deaths occur
during the breeding season, seasonal restrictions would substantially increase protections for
migratory birds. The Fish and Wildlife Service even recommended such measures. Memorandum
from the Acting Supervisor, Snake River Basin Office, to the Assistant Regional Director,
Columbia River Ecosystem, Region 1, 5 (May 20, 1997) (recommending that the Forest Service
include "timing and implementation requirements to protect migratory birds and their habitats");
Letter from Jennifer Fowler-Propst, Field Supervisor, United States Fish & Wildlife Services, to
Kurt L. Winchester, District Ranger, United States Forest Service (on file with author)
(recommending that logging operations should avoid nesting birds or "the Forest Service should
wait until the young have fledged from the area or reschedule the project outside of the period of
March through August").
63. Final Factual Record for Migratory Birds, supra note 46, at 44-46 (referring to the
California Forest Practice Act and its implementing regulations).
64. Id. at 10 (describing the "Petite Policy").
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submitters in Migratory Birds had little interest in the Petite Policy,
because submitters wanted to understand why the United States had a
nationwide policy, written or unwritten, of not investigating or
enforcing violations of the MBTA involving nonendangered or
nonthreatened species. That is, the submitters wanted information
relating to conduct in violation of the MBTA that has not been subject
to a prior state or federal proceeding.
IV. IMPACT OF THE COUNCIL'S ACTIONS

The manner in which the Council has narrowed the scope of
factual records-by rejecting investigations of general policy failuresallows parties to disrupt the factual inquiry process, dictates where
future claims will be brought, and sidesteps the Council's commitment
to ensure that the JPAC and the public are involved in any process to
amend the Article 14/15 Guidelines. While these consequences of the
Council's and the United States' actions do not directly harm the
environment, they have resulted in a loss of credibility in the Citizen
Submission Process among U.S. environmental organizations. Since
March 2000, no new submissions have been brought alleging that the
United States is failing to enforce environmental law.
A. Derailmentof the FactualInquiry Process

Allowing the Council to narrow factual records to isolated
examples enables governments to derail factual inquiries easily by
asserting that those specific cases are the subject of ongoing
proceedings or that they reflect a reasonable exercise of investigatory,
prosecutorial, regulatory, or compliance discretion. For example, in
Oldman River II the factual record certification and development
process was slowed because the one case among many selected by the
65
Council for review was the subject of a pending judicial proceeding.
In the future, a case with multiple appeals could be subject to significant
delays in the factual record review process. Further, Article 45(3)(a)
contemplates halting a factual inquiry for cases subject to judicial or
administrative proceedings. 66 The definition of "administrative
proceeding" encompasses a laundry list of terms, including the loose
wording, "seeking an assurance of voluntary compliance." 67 Limiting

65. Council Res. 00-02, CEC, C/C.01/00-04/RES/02 (May 16, 2000), at http://www.cec.org/
files/pdf/COUNCIL/00-02ejEN.pdf.
66. NAAEC, supra note 1, art. 45(3)(a), at 1495.

67. Id.
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submissions to specific examples of nonenforcement, which could then
be subject to such proceedings, could indefinitely bar important matters
from being addressed.
In fact, events since Oldman River II prove that this concern is
real. Canada initiated administrative actions identified in the BC-Mining
submission after the submission was filed.6 8 Because of Canada's
action, the two mines were removed from consideration in the factual

record. 69 The transparent nature of these sham administrative actions,
however, is manifest; the two-year limitation under Canadian law to
bring summary convictions had already expired and Canada failed to
respond to this concern of submitters.7 ° Moreover, a conservation group
reports that Canada has made no progress to eliminate acid mine
drainage at the Tulsequah mine, one of the mine sites eliminated from
consideration due to Canada's administrative action. 7'

In addition, governments may inequitably employ Article 45(1)'s
defenses for reasonable enforcement discretion and bona fide decisions
to allocate resources to enforcement of other environmental matters. In
practice, it is unquestionably easier to show such discretion when the
scope of a factual record is limited to one or two illustrative cases,
rather than a party's countrywide failure to enforce its environmental
laws. Governments can almost always point to one example that is
more, or equally, in need of resource allocation as another discrete
example. 72 Allowing such defenses in.the limited scope context, when
68. BC Mining was submitted in June 1998. Sierra Club of British Columbia, et al., A
Submission To The Commission On Environmental Cooperation Pursuant To Article 14 Of The
North American Agreement On Environmental Cooperation, BC Mining, A14/SEM/98004/01/SUB (June 1998) (SEM 98-004), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/98-4SUB-E.pdf. Canada sent letters to the owners of the Mt. Washington mine, used as an example of
Canada's widespread failure to enforce the Fisheries Act, on July 30, 1999. See Response Of The
Government Of Canada To A Submission On Enforcement Matters Under Articles 14 And 15 Of
The North American Agreement On Environmental Cooperation Submission at 22, BC Mining,
SEM/98-004/06/RSP (Sept. 8, 1999) (SEM 98-004), available at http://www.cec.org/
files/pdf/sem/98-4-RSP-E.pdf. On September 28, 1998, Canada sent a "warning letter" to the
owner of the Tulsequah Chief Mine, also used by submitters to illustrate Canada's pattern of
nonenforcement. Canada claimed that the warning letter constituted a "pending judicial or
administrative proceeding." Id. at 5-6, 24.
16, 2001),
(Nov.
CEC, C/C.01/01-06/RES/05/Final
69. Council Res. 01-11,
http://www.cec.org/filesiPDF/COUNCIL/res0l -1 le.pdf.
70. ELI REPORT, supra note 47, at 17.
71. Id. (citing Letter from Transboundary Watershed Alliance to Joint Public Advisory
Committee (Sept. 16, 2003)).
72. Accord Letter from Paul Kibel, Attorney at Fitzgerald, Abbott and Beardsley and
Adjunct Professor, Golden State University School of Law, to JPAC, Comments to JPAC on
CEC Council Actions Limiting Scope of Factual Records Prepared Pursuant to Articles 14 & 15
of NAAEC (Sept. 8, 2003) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative
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they would not have been effective in a submitter's original claim of
widespread enforcement failure, deflects party responsibility for
enforcement of environmental law on a broad scale.
B. TargetingMexico, Ignoring the United States

Limiting factual records to isolated, individualized instances will
increase the relative number of submissions against Mexico and Canada
by wiping out most of the claims for widespread noncompliance
brought against the United States. Citizens and environmental groups in
the United States often have recourse to citizen suit provisions through
domestic law. They will pursue binding remedies in a court of law for
the specific claims of government action or inaction of the type the
Council suggests are necessary to meet the "sufficiency" or scoping
tests. Broad, widespread policy failures, conversely, are not usually
subject to citizen suits in the United States.73 Thus, the Council may be
cutting off the last practical avenue for citizens to allege that the United
States is failing to effectively enforce its law by shutting the only
window for evaluating widespread patterns of nonenforcement. The
Citizen Submission Process may still be valuable for investigating
nonenforcement of environmental law in Canada and Mexico, where
some access to administrative bodies or courts for environmental harm
exists but citizen suits are not featured as widely as in the United States.
Evidence suggests that this tilt away from claims against the United
States is already underway. As of March 5, 2004, seven of the eleven
active claims involve Mexico; the other four involve Canada.74
C. Underminingthe Usefulness of FactualRecords

Eliminating widespread patterns of nonenforcement from the
scope of factual records greatly reduces their usefulness. As described
above in Section III(B)(2), case-specific failures to enforce do not
address the issues presented by submitters and result in factual records

Law Review) (stating that case-specific factual records "may be part of a programmatic policy of
nonenforcement that cannot properly be characterized as reasonable exercises of prosecutorial
discretion or bona fide enforcement allocation decisions").
73. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985). In footnote 4, the Supreme Court said that
in situations in which the agency has 'consciously and expressly adopted a general policy' that is
so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities.., the statute conferring
authority on the agency might indicate that such decisions were not "committed to agency
discretion."' Id. at 833.
74. See CEC, Current Status of Filed Submissions, available at http://www.cec.org/citizen/
status/index.cfln?varlan=english (last visited Apr. 21, 2004).
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of far less benefit. For example, a factual record that explores the failure
of the United States to enforce the MBTA over eighty-five years will
result in a far different factual record than one investigating the failure
of the United States to enforce two relatively minor violations of the
MBTA. Similarly, a factual record that explores violations at one mine,
as in BC Mining, offers much less information into the enforcement
policies and practices of Canada than an inquiry into widespread
failures to enforce at dozens of mines.
From an environmental perspective, case-specific factual records
fail to tell the whole story of nonenforcement. A focus on two minor
timber sales in Migratory Birds may yield some insight into
enforcement practices, but an investigation of widespread patterns of
nonenforcement for eighty-five years may yield important information
concerning enforcement practices as well as the cumulative effect on
bird populations from MBTA nonenforcement in all timber sales in a
region. Similarly, submitters in BC Logging reported that their concerns
with widespread patterns of nonenforcement would yield information
about the cumulative impact of clear-cutting stream banks, individual
stream crossings, and landslide prone areas.75
To overcome this problem, some have considered filing
submissions with respect to dozens of specific violations within a single
submission. This would be no great challenge with respect to timber
sales in the United States. Many environmental impact statements for
timber sales include statements from U.S. Fish and Wildlife officials
acknowledging that logging the timber sale area will result in violations
of the MBTA.76 Of course, that only triggers the Council's second
device to limit factual records-the claim of insufficient information.
Before the Council decides that a submission lacks sufficient
information to conduct a factual record, however, the Secretariat will
have already invested significant resources in determining that the
submission warrants a factual record. While this process does not
directly produce negative environmental results, it wastes scarce
resources of the Secretariat and the Commission that could be put to
productive environmental purposes, such as investigating a country's
failure to enforce environmental law.

75. Letter from Randy L. Christensen, supra note 8.
76. See, e.g., Memorandum from the Acting Supervisor, supra note 62; Letter from Jennifer
Fowler-Propst, supra note 62.
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D. Sidestepping the JPA C-Led Public ConsultationMechanismfor
Changing the Guidelinesfor Submissions on Enforcement Matters
The Council met in June 2000 amidst widespread concerns that the
parties were engaged in backroom negotiations to revise the Guidelines
in a manner that further restricted public access to the mechanism. 77 In
particular, the Council was entertaining proposals to narrow the scope
of factual records and to limit the Secretariat's fact gathering powers.
Public concern over these potential revisions, as communicated by an
energized JPAC, halted the discussions and led to Council Resolution
00_09.78 The Resolution assured that the JPAC would play a central role
in facilitating public input and formulating advice for any proposed
guideline revisions. 79 The Resolution also permitted the JPAC to hold
public consultations 80on the implementation and operation of the Citizen
Submission Process.
Since the adoption of Resolution 00-09, the Council has achieved
some of the very rule changes under consideration in 2000 by simply
narrowing the scope of factual records and by devising cramped
definitions of terms like "sufficient information" in specific decisions.
The Council is simply making an end-run around Resolution 00-09 by
circumventing JPAC input and the JPAC-led public consultation
procedure, thereby accomplishing the same objective in secret without
providing its rationale or reasoning.
V.

IMPROVING THE CITIZEN SUBMISSION PROCESS

Despite the serious concerns regarding the direction of the Citizen
Submission Process, the process can be fixed. The history of the World
Bank's Inspection Panel provides a compelling example of a process
derailed and put back on its tracks. Whereas the discussion of the World
Bank's Inspection Panel injects a ray of hope that the NAAEC's Citizen
Submission process can recover, the recommendations that follow
provide the practical tools for that recovery.

77. These concerns were conveyed by JPAC, the NAC, and the NGO through advice and
letters in addition to a lead editorial in the Washington Post that warned the NAFTA Parties
against weakening the fragile but valuable Citizen Submission Process. See How to Wreck Trade,
WASH. POST, June 10, 2000, at A22.
78. Council Res. 00-09, CEC, C/00-00/RES/09/REV. 2 (June 13, 2002), http://www.cec.org/
files/pdf/council/00-09een.pdf.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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A. Comparison with the World Bank Inspection Panel
The World Bank Inspection Panel (Panel) presents a helpful
analogy to the NAAEC's Citizen Submission Process. The Panel and
the CEC Secretariat both started operations in 1994.81 The Panel
responds to citizen requests for investigation of the failure of the World
Bank Management to enforce its policies. 82 Quite frequently, these
requests are based on actual or potential environmental destruction
resulting from or threatened by a World Bank project. The Panel, like
the Secretariat, determines the eligibility of a submitter's claim and
decides whether to recommend an investigation. The World Bank Board
of Executive Directors (Board), like the Council, then decides whether
to approve the recommendation. The Panel investigates the situation
and prepares a factual record. 83
The strikingly similar processes have faced strikingly similar
challenges. The Bank Management was often in close contact with the
Board while the Panel was still determining eligibility. The Board often
debated the substance of requests in the beginning stages of the process
and narrowed the scope of investigations, sending the Panel back to get
more information. In 1999, the World Bank recognized that those
problems were "undermining the independence and authority of the
Panel. 84 To a large extent, the resulting 1999 Clarifications rectified
those problems. The Board reaffirmed the Panel's functions and
independence by clearly stating that the Panel, not the Board, had the
authority to judge the merits of a claimant's petition, including whether
or not eligibility criteria had been met.85 Now, the Board votes "yes" or

81. Although the Inspection Panel was created in 1993, it did not begin operations until
at http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/
Overview,
Group,
Bank
World
The
1994.
ipn/ipnweb.nsf/WOverview/overview?opendocument (last visited Apr. 21, 2004). Website for the
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (Canadian Office), at
http://www.naaec.gc.ca/eng/agreement/agreement-e.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2004).
82. See Resolution Establishing the Inspection Panel, Res. No. IBRD 93-10, International
12 (Sept. 22, 1993), available at
Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
http://wblnOO1 8.worldbank.org/IPN/ipnweb.nsf.
83. Review of the Resolution Establishing the Inspection Panel: Clarification of Certain
Aspects of the Resolution, in THE WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL MANUAL, BANK PROCEDURES,

BP 17.55-ann.B (Feb.
Manuals/OpManual.nsf.

1997),

available at http://wblnOO18.worldbank.org/InstitutionalU

84. WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL, ACCOUNTABILITY AT THE WORLD BANK-THE
INSPECTION PANEL 10 YEARS ON 32 (2003).

85. Conclusions of the Board's Second Review of the Inspection Panel, 1999 Clarifications,
The Inspection Panel (Apr. 20, 1999), available at http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/
IPN/ipnweb.nsf
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"no" on the development of a factual record, just as the clear language
of the NAAEC allows the Council to do.
By delineating clear boundaries between the Panel and Board, the
World Bank was able to restore legitimacy and confidence in their
process and alleviate tension between the Board, the Panel, and citizens.
Instead of constantly struggling with each other for power, each
component now has a clearly specified role. From the World Bank's
experience, the CEC can gain not only a model for its Citizen
Submission Process, but also learn the lesson that institutional
legitimacy is ultimately dependent upon public perception.
B. Recommendations to Improve the Citizen Submission Process
The steps that the Council must take to remedy the Citizen
Submission Process are small, even if the implications of those small
steps are large. Very sensible adjustments to the roles of the Secretariat
and the Council, in particular, would regain the trust of environmental
groups. Moreover, either the three Parties or the Council should
authorize the preparation of recommendations to implement the
underlying failures that emerge from the factual records.
1. Roles of the Secretariat and Council
Most important, the Council must relinquish its grip on the Citizen
Submission Process. Whether in the NAAEC itself or in the Revised
Guidelines for Submissions on Enforcement Matters Under Articles 14
and 15, the governments must make clear that the Secretariat has the
duty to make all the findings designated to it under Article 14 and 15.
That is, the Guidelines must make clear, as the International
Environmental Law Project, JPAC, and others have recommended, that
the Secretariat has the sole authority to:
* determine if the submission meets the eligibility
requirements, including if the submission includes
"sufficient information," and
*

determine the scope of the factual record, consistent with the
information provided in the factual 86
record, including broad
patterns of nonenforcement conduct.

On the other hand, the Guidelines must make clear that the Council
has the authority to vote "yes" or "no" on the development of a factual
record as recommended by the Secretariat and whether or not to make
86.

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PROJECT, supra note 5.
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the factual record public. The Council should not revise the Guidelines,
remand submissions, or take any other action to narrow the definition of
"sufficient information" to exclude broad patterns of nonenforcement
conduct under NAAEC Article 14(1)(c).
2. Burden of Proof
Some commentators have suggested limiting the Council's
authority to overrule a recommendation of the Secretariat based on an
"arbitrary and capricious" standard of review from U.S. administrative
law 8 7 or a "patently unreasonable" standard from Canadian
administrative law. 88
While a standard of review, even one that provides the Secretariat
with discretion, appears appealing, it does not solve the problems
currently facing the Citizen Submission Process. No one has criticized
the Secretariat for making unreasonable or arbitrary decisions. Rather,
the problem lies with the Council's strict control of the process. If the
Council retains the authority to overrule the Secretariat when the
Council wants or thinks the Secretariat has acted in an arbitrary or
unreasonable way, control of the process still rests in the hands of the
Council. If no institution exists to overrule the Council, then no progress
has been achieved to control the unfettered exercise of power by the
Council.
Given the universal acclaim for the opinions of the Secretariat, a
better option is to sharply circumscribe the roles of the Secretariat and
the Council as noted above. In the future, if scholarly and other nonparty opinion suggests that the Secretariat is not effectuating its duties
appropriately, then perhaps a discussion of a "standard of review"
should ensue. It seems premature to take away the authority and
discretion of the Secretariat when it has shown no inclination towards
bias, much less abuse of its authority and discretion.
3. Role of Parties
The parties should be reminded of their role as stewards of the
NAAEC and not solely as defendants in a fact-gathering process.
Accordingly, the parties should treat the Citizen Submission Process as
the collaborative process the drafters intended. Moreover, the JPAC
noted that members of the Council appear to have a conflict of interest

87. ELI REPORT, supra note 47, at 22 n.117 (referring to a suggestion from John Knox).
88. Jerry DeMarco, Sierra Legal Defence Fund, Re: Supplementary Written Comments
Related to Articles 14 and 15 (Oct. 23, 2003) (on file with author).
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because they cannot differentiate between their roles as both a member
of the Council and as a party. The JPAC expressed its concern 89
that "the
influence of the Parties is being reflected in Council decisions."
4. Transparency
The Council should fully implement Council Resolution 00-09,
and thus begin respecting the JPAC's central role in consulting with the
public and formulating advice to the Council on issues concerning the
implementation and further elaboration of Articles 14 and 15. The JPAC
again expressed its dismay that the Council continues to:
[j]eopardize the commitment, expressed in Council Resolution 0009, to increase transparency and public participation in the citizen
submission process; and violate the object and purpose, or 'spirit' of
Council Resolution 00-09, which as we'll all recall was a hardfought compromise designed to allow
the process to move forward
9
and re-establish public confidence. 0
5. Recommendations and Monitoring
The Process would benefit from some form of monitoring of
governmental actions after the completion of the factual record. In
Migratory Birds, for example, the factual record reported that "this
factual record provides information regarding two alleged violations of
the MBTA resulting from logging operations as to which the federal
government took no enforcement action. These examples are consistent
with the federal government's record to date
of never having enforced
9t
the MBTA in regard to logging operations."
Yet, the factual record was a dead end. Neither the Secretariat nor
the Council suggested actions that the United States could undertake to
implement the MBTA in light of the concerns of the submitters or the
United States. Nor could submitters, the Secretariat, or the Council
coerce the United States to enforce the MBTA. While recognizing that
the Citizen Submission Process is designed to be collaborative, not
coercive, a process for providing recommendations and monitoring
implementation of those recommendations would contribute more
meaningfully to the fulfillment of the NAAEC's objectives to improve
enforcement policies and practices.

89. JPAC, Advice to Council 03-05, supra note 12, at 3. That said, JPAC was not sure how
to resolve this conflict of interest and will develop an opinion on how best to proceed. Id.
90. Id.
91. Final Factual Record for Migratory Birds, supra note 46, § 7, at 63.
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Article 17.8.8 of the Dominican Republic-Central AmericanUnited States Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) improves on the
NAAEC's Citizen Submission Process by requiring the DR-CAFTA
Council to, "as appropriate, provide recommendations to the
Environmental Cooperation Commission related to matters addressed in
the factual record, including recommendations related to the further
development of the Party's domestic mechanisms for monitoring its
environmental enforcement." 92 DR-CAFTA takes steps towards using
the factual record as part of an ongoing process to improve
environmental enforcement or takes other steps to achieve
environmental benefits from the Citizen Submission Process.
Nonetheless, it does so to the exclusion of the submitters - those who
originally brought the issues to the attention of the parties and the larger
public. The CEC's Council, working with the Secretariat, JPAC, and

interested citizens, should develop additional guidelines for adopting a
scheme similar to DR-CAFTA's, but which also brings submitters into
the process. Such a process may encourage the involved government to
reevaluate, or as in the case of Migratory
Birds, to evaluate for the first
93
enforcement.
to
approaches
time,
VI. CONCLUSION

At its inception, the NAAEC's Citizen Submission Procedure was
hailed as an innovative means of giving a voice to citizens concerned
with the environment in the context of globalization and free trade. It
has become a model for free trade agreements, with the Canada-Chile
Free Trade Agreement and DR-CAFTA adopting similar processes.
Nonetheless, the mechanism has failed to fulfill its promise and it
must be strengthened. To do so the Parties must avoid even the
perception that they are restricting the ability of citizens to raise
concerns about the effective enforcement of environmental law in North
America. Environmental groups who have supported the development
and implementation of the Citizen Submission Process are growing
increasingly frustrated over the Council's unwillingness to respect the
boundaries established in the process. If this perception continues, many
of the groups who have supported and defended the Citizen Submission
92. Dominican Republic-Central American-United States Free Trade Agreement, (Aug. 5,
2004), art. 17.8.8,
at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/DR-CAFTA/DRCAFTAFINALTEXTS/Section Index.html.
93. David L. Markell, Enhancing Citizen Involvement in Environmental Governance, 18
NATURAL RESOURCES & ENV'T (forthcoming 2004) (draft on file with the Loyola of Los
Angeles International & Comparative Law Review).
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Process may simply abandon the process and declare it, and the CEC,
inappropriately, tailored to meet the challenges of environmental
enforcement. To the extent that other trade agreements adopt the
NAAEC's process, those citizen submission processes will also be
tarnished and discarded.
The spirit and letter of the NAAEC support the development of
factual records on broad patterns of government conduct that may
reveal systematic deficiencies in environmental enforcement.
Conversely, narrowing factual inquiries to highly localized and specific
acts or omissions will: (1) frustrate the objectives of the NAAEC by
reducing the importance of the matters at issue; (2) focus inquiries on
specific companies and enterprises, rather than on widespread
government practices and conduct; and (3) enable governments to more
easily derail factual inquiries by asserting that the matter is the subject
of an ongoing judicial or administrative hearing or reflects a reasonable
exercise of investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, or compliance
discretion. In the end, such a limited process will fail to provide the full
range of environmental benefits otherwise available through the Citizen
Submission Process.
By modifying the scope of factual records and attempting to limit
the kind of information the Secretariat can consider, the Council is
calling for the preparation of factual records that no one, except the
Council, wants. Surely the Citizen Submission Process was not
designed to achieve this absurd outcome. The Council has also usurped
the role of the Secretariat by attempting to constrain the definition of
"sufficiency of information."
The Council certainly knows what it must do to restore public
confidence in the process and to ensure its effectiveness. It must release
its grip on the process and embrace the NAAEC's cooperative spirit.
The question is whether it has the political will to do so.

